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SUBJECT: KHARTOUM: EUSR BRYLLE DISCUSSES CPA, DARFUR

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Re-focusing on the CPA  
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¶1. (SBU) In a September 17 meeting in Khartoum, EU Special Representative for Sudan Thorben Brylle and CDA Fernandez agreed that the Darfur crisis should not detract from international attention on implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Brylle noted that his current trip to Sudan had concentrated on North/South issues, including visits to potential flashpoints such as Malakal and Bentiu. CDA Fernandez said that the international community must "multi-task" in pressing for both an end to the Darfur conflict and sustained focus on the CPA.

¶2. (SBU) Characterizing the interaction between North and South Sudan as an "unbalanced, symbiotic relationship," Brylle said that the National Congress Party (NCP) did not want the CPA to collapse but was ignoring the proper sequencing through 2011 that is stipulated in the agreement. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) lacked capacity and made tactical errors. Brylle called First Vice President Salva Kiir's recent speech mentioning a return to war "a little over the hill." CDA Fernandez noted that while the NCP was the shrewdest political actor in Sudan, often out-maneuvering the SPLM, the SPLM was relatively more sophisticated than any of the other forces in the country, such as the Darfur movements. He said that the U.S. was supporting capacity building in South Sudan to strengthen the SPLM's hand but was conscious to avoid certain "redlines" that might lead to belligerence.

¶3. (SBU) Brylle recalled that the EU had held a recent meeting in which it decided to explore a broad-based, international conference to regain focus on CPA implementation. He was traveling to Nairobi on September 18 to discuss the issue with Kenyan Special Envoy for Sudan Daniel Arap Moi. CDA Fernandez said that the U.S. supported an IGAD or IGAD partners meeting to review the CPA and demonstrate to the NCP that the international community was "watching." Regarding the recent resignation of Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) chairman Tom Vraalsen, CDA Fernandez said that the NCP had responded with a "classic line: the problem was the individual, who they said was biased, not the process. They say they continue to support the process." Brylle called Vraalsen's resignation "symptomatic" of a trend in NCP decision-making. After agreeing to the UN/AU hybrid force for Darfur and negotiations with Darfur's rebels, it "turned the screw" in another area. Fernandez explained that while a good portion of the problems in the AEC emanated from the NCP, the SPLM was also responsible for seeming disinterest, often not preparing--or even attending--AEC meetings.

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Darfur Political Process Stumbling  
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¶4. (SBU) During a meeting with Brylle in Khartoum, National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Director General Salah Ghosh had described three "umbrellas" of the Darfur rebel movements going into the Libya talks: 1) the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), 2) the Zaghawa factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and 3) the Fur factions of the SLA. Ghosh had said that the rebels cannot come "at their own will" to and from the negotiations once the talks begin. Brylle said that SLA leader Abdulwahid al Nur, a Fur who has rejected the Libya talks, "needed a reality check." He suggested that the international community's continued focus and interaction with Abdulwahid "contributed to the problem" by increasing his profile. Brylle further stated that the NCP was "changing its attitude" on strict adherence to the DPA by showing some flexibility for the negotiations but that Khartoum remained "fairly confident they can manipulate the process." Brylle and CDA Fernandez agreed that the marginalization of Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minawi discouraged other movements from joining the peace process and that his figurehead status would have to be addressed.

¶5. (SBU) CDA Fernandez said that the U.S. was concerned about the political process for several reasons: 1) the disunity among the rebel factions prior to negotiations, 2) the disconnect between the rebel movements and the civilian population, 3) Abulwahid's continued intransigence, raising the question of who could speak for the Fur, and 4) the problematic Libyan venue, which might contribute to Eritrea

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becoming a spoiler. Brylle and CDA Fernandez agreed that the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) could, in cooperation with the UN, provide a mechanism for channeling civil society concerns into the peace process. Brylle also said that the international community should pressure Eritrea to prevent it from disrupting the process, inferring that the EU could use its influence with Asmara.  
FERNANDEZ